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Abstract
Wang Shi, a business mogul who created his empire of wealth from scratch, relished
in his fame and basked in the glory of his affluent business. Nothing lasts forever! After
mastering the turbulent business of real estate development in his country and there-
fore enjoying a rising and robust stock price, China Vanke Co. Ltd (âĂĲVankeâĂİ)
founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Wang Shi was suddenly presented
with a scathing notice from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange: rival Baoneng Group
(âĂĲBaonengâĂİ) filed the regulatory documentation indicating that it had nicode-
mously acquired 5% of his company and was looking to buy more. Vanke case became
brutal and sparked national controversy over corporate governance and the role of Chi-
nese government in capital markets.
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1 Introduction
Baoneng is a fierce rival that does busi-
ness in a way Wang calls âĂĲvulgarâĂİ; in
no way would he allow his company and its
stellar reputation and glory be plundered by
an ensuing majority ownership and thus con-
trol over Vanke by BaonengâĂŹs predatory
founder and 46 year old CEO Yao Zhenhua.
The tranquility of business at Vanke and
the harmony in ChinaâĂŹs nascent world of
M&A was rattled in their core. Even the
Chinese government disapprovingly took no-
tice. Wang Shi labelled the takeover not
only hostile but also âĂŸpredatoryâĂŹ and
further denounced an attempt by Baoneng
to become the major shareholder stating
that Shenzhen Jushenghua Industrial Devel-
opment Co., ("Jushenghua"), BaonengâĂŹs
subsidiary, used reckless debt to finance the
share acquisition. This marked the brewing
of a takeover battle, which gained attention
in mainstream media, boardrooms and fur-
ther attracted a consortium of companies to
the battleground for control.
2 History of Vanke
Wang Shi founded China Vanke, which
boasts over thirty years of experience in the
housing market, in 1988 in Shenzhen. The
1982 draft of the sixth Five Year Plan under
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping focused on
reform and premised on progress towards a
market economy, at the same time opening a
window for the then 1988 provisional regula-
tions on private enterprises that allowed the
legitimization of sole proprietorship, partner-
ships and limited liability corporations. The
same wave of reform saw the inception of
conglomerates that have now become lead-
ing brands in todayâĂŹs Chinese markets.
When Vanke was established, real estate and
housing in China had not gained traction
and average income per capita was below 2
000 yuan. Low demand for housing is at-
tributed to this phenomenon where China
had a large rural population accounting for
over 80% in early 1980s and roughly, 20%
lived in the cities. This curtailed growth in
real estate sector. Vanke, a first mover in
real estate, consolidated market share and
as GDP grew exponentially each year, the
demand for houSsing and real estate devel-
opment boomed.
VankeâĂŹs mission has three focus areas.
Firstly, the company has defined itself as a
Global Residential Developer. A large por-
tion of yearly sales are driven by this cate-
gory through providing U8 decoration sys-
tem, BIM based quality control and refab-
ricated housing. Secondly, Vanke markets
itself as an integrated urban property ser-
vice provider which includes shopping malls,
integrated complex development, Vanke Ed-
ucation, Vanke Resort, and long term leasing
apartments. Lastly, Vanke Worldwide is also
one of the oldest focus areas of the company.
Having established operations in more than
71 cities in China, Vanke Worldwide Strat-
egy has enabled the company to cover five
cities outside China including Singapore, San
Francisco, New York and London. Real es-
tate started experiencing significant growth
around 1990 largely because of opening up
and reform agenda. After Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges were set up in 1990
and 1991, respectively, Vanke was one of the
first companies to be listed in 1991 on Shen-
zhen Stock Exchange. In 1993, Vanke also
issued B shares and established residential
property development as its core business.
Revenue and profit growth for Vanke aver-
aged 29.1% and 31.3% compounded yearly
from 1991, and the shares increased value
correspondingly. From 1990, there was a
steady growth in urban population. Between
1990 and 2000, urban population surged from
28% to 36% and by 2007; urban population
was approaching 50%. This increased the
demand for housing as more and more peo-
ple relocated to urban areas in search for
jobs and a better life. Consequently, middle-
income households grew faster and the num-
ber of households who could afford to own a
house increased as wages soured. Urbaniza-
tion became the driver for real estate growth.
In addition to that, the government relaxed
regulations on land, for example, Article 64
of the Property Rights Law made it possi-
ble to own estates and immovable property,
which opened doors for real estate compa-
nies to borrow excessively from banks and
buy land from government for development.
Total revenue hit 100 billion yuan in 2010
and Vanke has continued to enjoy enviable
profits. In 2015, Vanke posted 261.47 billion
yuan in revenue (see Figure 1), a year on year
growth of 14.3% making it an industry leader
in China based on sales revenue. In July
2016, the company was listed on the âĂĲ-
Fortune Global 500âĂİ by Fortune Magazine
for the first time, ranked 356th.
Other Chinese developers that appeared on
the list include Wanda and Evergrande.
VankeâĂŹs success cannot only be attributed
to ChinaâĂŹs rising middle income and ur-
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banization, but also to Wang ShiâĂŹs strat-
egy to enter new international territories such
as Singapore, United States and United King-
dom. China Vanke entered the U.S. when
the real estate market was recovering from
the 2008 recession and its investments have
been made during a period with reasonable
prices. Major Chinese developers such as
Wanda and Greenland Group have targeted
Chinese immigrants in New York and Cal-
ifornia as their customer base. They have
also invested in office property acquisitions,
schools and hotels. According to Wang Shi,
entering US market gives Vanke an opportu-
nity to learn and understand business models
in a developed market and gain management
experience through project cooperation with
other US developers. In 2013, Vanke part-
nered with Tishman Speyer and another US
developer, Hines, to develop a San Francisco
condominium project which became one of
the early moves of Vanke in U.S. In Septem-
ber 2016, in a bid to step up its overseas
investments from 5% to the 20% target, the
company agreed to purchase Ryder Court in
Mayfair, an office building located in Cen-
tral London for GBP115 million. The prop-
erty was acquired from UK-based Hender-
son Global Investors whose shareholders had
mounting uncertainties in the real estate mar-
ket after Brexit vote. Despite speculation of
a decline in housing market due to uncertain-
ties following Brexit, Vanke’s overseas invest-
ments have paid off. It improved the com-
panyâĂŹs performance, positioned it to be
the market leader in ChinaâĂŹs real estate -
making it one of the attractive companies on
the stock market. Individual investors and
corporations began to regard Vanke as an
investment choice after the company outper-
formed all other developers consecutively in
China. However, when China’s economy re-
verted to a "New Normal", a dilemna occured
on the markets: stocks were overvalued and
economic performance could not match the
rising stock prices. The government encour-
aged companies to prop up the stock market.
New regulation that was passed to allow pen-
sion funds and insurance companies to invest
in bonds and money market instruments pro-
vided a leeway for real estate companies to
access capital easily. Pension funds and in-
surance companies which had huge sums of
cash reserves also snapped the opportunity
to venture in trading high risk assets. On
the market, amongst real estate companies,
Vanke stood out due to its stunning perfor-
mance and this triggered a takeover attempt.
Figure 1: Vanke’s Annual Sales Revenue
3 The Battle for Control 1:
Baoneng vs Vanke
Vanke had not encountered a takeover at-
tempt and battle for control since its found-
ing. The only time there was a tussle was on
March 30, 1994 when Junan Securities rep-
resenting 4 big investors purchased large vol-
ume of stocks of Vanke on the secondary mar-
ket. The stock market in China was barely
4 years old and the regulations vague. Wang
Shi considered it as a potential takeover.
Vanke shares were suspended and Wang Shi
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met with the investors from Jinan Securities.
On April 4, Wang Shi announced victory and
the shares resumed trading. Despite the po-
tential takeover, Wang Shi did not consider
consolidating his ownership, which he gave
up when the company went public in 1991,
instead, shares kept floating on the market
âĂŞ posing a threat for another takeover.
In 2000, Vanke welcomed China Resources
(Holding) Co. Ltd ("China Resources"), (see
Figure 2) as a major shareholder. China
Resources controlled a stake of 14.89%. On
July 25, 2016, Wang Shi woke up to dis-
cover that 15.04% of Vanke’s A shares had
been purchased by Foresea Life Insurance
Ltd ("Foresea Life"), at an average of 14.4
yuan per piece since July 10th. At that time,
Foresea Life was 20% owned by Jushenghua
which in turn was 99% owned by Baoneng
Group (see Figure 2). Wang Shi called the
purchase an attempt for hostile takeover and
rejected Jushenghua and Foresea Life as ma-
jor shareholders of Vanke, citing that the
share purchase was bought by short-term
debt, which could further negatively affect
VankeâĂŹs capital structure. Vanke held an
urgent meeting to plan against the takeover
and battle Baoneng. China Resources had
been VankeâĂŹs largest shareholder for 15
years, would the state-owned company res-
cue Vanke from the battle?
Figure 2: Ownership Structure of China Resources and Baoneng
On September 1, China Resources in-
creased controlling stake to 15.29% at a cost
of 500 million yuan. Baoneng Group con-
tinued to use its subsidiaries to purchase
shares and consolidate its position as the
largest shareholder of Vanke. Vanke’s stock
price shot up rythmically in response to the
takeover and within two weeks of Decem-
ber, the stock rose 33% to 22.21 yuan a
piece, increasing the market capitalization
of the developer to a whooping 245.5 bil-
lion yuan. Meanwhile, An Bang Insurance
Group, a global insurance company with to-
tal assets of nearly 1971 billion yuan was
VankeâĂŹs second largest shareholder. It
raised its stake from 4.4% to 5% in Decem-
ber after Jushenghua and Foresea Life had
lifted their stake twice on December 4 and
10th from 15.29% to 22.25% at a total aver-
age cost of 7.46 billion yuan. Total number of
shares owned by Foresea Life and Jushenghua
stood at 2.21 billion, acquired at a staggering
cost of 35 billion yuan (Security Times). Bao-
neng stated the controversial acquisition was
motivated by VankeâĂŹs performance and
further expressed that the continued invest-
ment in Vanke was to hid a call by govern-
ment to prop up stock markets. As the bat-
tle for control continued through impulsive
purchases of VankeâĂŹs stocks, China Secu-
rities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC"); the
regulatory arm of government for securities,
reported they would not intervene as long
as the players abide by rules. Vanke would
have welcomed the intervention of govern-
ment to cool down the heat on the stock
market. Although investors were taking the
risk to purchase VankeâĂŹs expensive shares
which were trading at 3 times book value,
they also feared that the stocks were over-
valued and did not reflect the actual per-
formance of the company. Furthermore, un-
certainty over VankeâĂŹs reaction to reverse
the takeover increased. The effect would send
the prices plunging down significantly. Inter-
national watchdogs for investors began to
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offer warnings about the future of Vanke.
For example, on December 16, Morgan Stan-
ley swapped Vanke off âĂĲChina FocusâĂİ
list and the following day, Goldman Sachs
scrapped Vanke off the âĂĲConvictionâĂİ
list. An Bang, which had strongly affirmed its
support for Wang Shi raised its stake further
to 7.01% on December 17 despite these warn-
ing signs. Fitch confirmed that VankeâĂŹs
ratings were immediately unaffected by the
tussle and that it will monitor the develop-
ments closely. How prepared was Vanke to
oust an unwavering adversary without actual
ownership of the company? Vanke halted
trade on December 18 at 13:00, citing asset
restructuring and acquisition after the stock
price had surged by 62% in December alone.
3.1 VankeâĂŹs defense mecha-
nism
When Vanke suspended trading of its
shares, its largest shareholders were Bao-
neng with 24.4% stake, followed by China
Resources, which had 15.3%, An Bang was
third at 7%, Guosen Jinping controlled4.7%
while China Galaxy Securities owned 3.5%,
China Securities Finance Corp had 3.4% and
Citic Securities owned 3.1% (see Figure 3).
Before the takeover, most of VankeâĂŹs frag-
mented share structure made it easy for a
fierce conglomerate like Baoneng to make
a bulk purchase of shares on the market.
After halting trading, investors speculated
that Vanke could use a poison pill strategy
to dilute BaonengâĂŹs stake. The strat-
egy would have Vanke issue new shares to
a private investor at a discount, thereby di-
luting not only BaonengâĂŹs but also other
major shareholdersâĂŹ stake. Moreover, a
buyback of shares from individual investors
was a possible alternative, only executable
if Vanke has the resources to purchase the
overvalued shares. Earlier in July 2015 when
the hostile takeover began, Vanke set out 10
billion yuan to buy back shares but due to
the surge in price, they could only repur-
chase 160 million worth of shares, accounting
for 0.113%. Other sources contemplated that
China Resources would continue to increase
controlling interest in Vanke to regain control
as the largest shareholder.
Figure 3: Ownership Structure of Vanke
3.2 A White Knight
Hong Kong âĂŸHâĂŹ shares resumed
trading on January 6 and share price plum-
meted as investors feared that a reverse on
the takeover attempt was looming. On March
14, Vanke announced its defense strategy.
The developer had found a white knight,
Shenzhen Metro Group Co. Ltd ("Shen-
zhen Metro"), to ease the pressure off Vanke.
They signed an MOU with Shenzhen Metro
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agreeing to sell part of its assets to Vanke
in exchange for shares and cash. The deal,
estimated at 60 billion yuan was designed
to have Vanke acquire Shenzhen Metro for
45.6 billion yuan through offering 2.87 bil-
lion new shares at 15.88 yuan a piece in
exchange for 20.65% stake in Vanke. This
seemingly amicable arrangement would dilute
BaonengâĂŹs stake to 19%. When China
Resources learnt that their stake was at risk
of dilution, they disapproved the deal and
blamed Vanke for not consulting them. In
board meeting to decide the striking Shen-
zhen Metro deal, seven voted in favour of
the deal and three board members from
China Resources voted against it while one
board member abstained. Vanke made a tri-
umphant announcement of victory to proceed
with the deal. China Resources grudgingly
questioned the legality of the boardâĂŹs res-
olution in that the rules required 2/3 majority
for the deal to pass, and the 7/11 vote was
insufficient. Though Jushenghua and Foresea
Life were not invited to the board meeting,
they unequivocally expressed their rejection
of the proposal. After the vote, Baoneng
criticizing Vanke’s executives for mismanage-
ment of the company and immediately called
out to oust Wang Shi and all his board mem-
bers. The decision to oust Vanke caused H
shares to slip 3.8% even though rating agen-
cies had warned against it. Vendors began to
renegotiate contract terms as more and more
traders dumped the shares. The decision
by China Resources and Baoneng to block
Shenzhen Metro deal raised suspicion that
the two were acting in concert. On June 27,
CSRC asked whether Baoneng and China Re-
sources were acting in concert. While China
Resources had rejected the Shenzhen Metro
deal, they opposed the proposal by Baoneng
to oust VankeâĂŹs management. They fur-
ther clarified that China Resources did not
reach an agreement with Baoneng to vote in
concert.
3.3 VankeâĂŹs performance
During mergers and acquisitions, com-
pany culture can change dramatically and
employees may leave the company or lose
their jobs. One of Vanke’s Non-Executive
Directors, tendered his resignation on Decem-
ber 22, 2016. Vanke denied allegations that
the resignation was prompted by misman-
agement of the takeover feud. On January
1, Vanke posted total sales of 262.7 billion
yuan, making it the number one developer in
China by sales revenue. This confirmed that
VankeâĂŹs ongoing battle for control did
not eat into the companyâĂŹs revenue and
growth, (see Figure 1). In February, Vanke
beat 17 developers to win a residential site in
Hong Kong Government tender. At the end
of the same month, the U.S unit of China
Vanke joined with Slate Property Group and
Adam America Real Estate to purchase 45
Rivington Street for U.S$116 million. Back
in mainland China, the developer began to
incorporate a new business model dubbed
âĂĲRail + PropertyâĂİ by entering into
strategic partnership with Shenzhen Metro
Group and acquire its property division. As
parties to the tussle fought tooth and nai to
gain control, Vanke bought 96.55% interest
in property firms held by Blackstone, a U.S
financial services company, at a cost of 3.89
billion yuan.
On July 22, a day after sealing the deal
with Blackstone, Vanke announced to pay
2015 cash dividends of 7.20 yuan pretax, for
every 10 shares held as of July 28, 2015.
The 6-month January to July contract sales
were 217.5 billion yuan, which was relatively
higher, compared to the previous year. Even
though the second quarter financial state-
ments for Vanke showed the companyâĂŹs
performance had improved year on year,
the third quarter results released in Octo-
ber showed that Evergrande had surpassed
Vanke in total sales in the month of Au-
gust. VankeâĂŹs total sales grew by 49% and
the developer criticised Baoneng for reducing
confidence among partners and customers.
This led to project cancellations and tighter
credit. The long run effects would cloud
Vanke’s performance and pose risk among
shareholders. Investors rallied behind the
feud, driving stock price high while paying
superficial attention to operational and fi-
nancial results.
4 Battle for Control 2: The
more the merrier
On July 1, VankeâĂŹs listed shares in
Shenzhen resumed trading for the first time
in more than six months, (see Figure 4).
The anticipated restructuring process was
widely viewed by investors as an opportunity
grasped by Vanke to reverse the takeover.
Out of fear, investors started ditching the A
shares and they plunged 10% - triggering a
halt, to 21.99 yuan from 24.43 yuan which
was the closing price on the day of suspen-
sion. On the other hand, H shares jumped
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significantly up by 8.4% to HK$16.48 on the
same day. As shares resumed trading and
price fell, Baoneng remained unfazed and
seized the opportunity to increase stake to
24.972% at a cost of 1.5 billion yuan. The
regulations in mainland China does not al-
low shares to fluctuate by more than 10%
in a day, and in the event that daily volatil-
ity reaches 10%, a halt will be triggered to
suspend trading for that day. Another con-
troversial rule on ChinaâĂŹs equity markets
is the T+1 which only allows investors to sell
stocks at least after one day of holding it.
In other words, investors are forbidden from
selling stocks that they have bought on the
same day. The T+1 comes after the CSRC
abandoned the T+0 strategy which was im-
plemented in 1995 but later abandoned in a
bid to control market volatility and risk. The
ongoing debate on this issue is whether T+1
reduces or exacerbates market volatility and
market manipulation as well as protect the
interests of investors.
Figure 4: Performance of Vanke’s shares before and after suspension
4.1 China Evergrande joins the
takeover battle
On August 4, Wang Shi was rattled by
the news that Evergrande Real Estate Group
Ltd ("Evergrande Group"), a Fortune500 de-
veloper started in Guangzhou in 1996 had
bought 4.68% stake in his company, making
it the fourth largest shareholder in Vanke.
The purchase of 516.9 million A shares at
a total cost of 9.1 billion yuan had Vanke
stock reaching the 10% volatility peak, clos-
ing at 19.67 yuan in Shenzhen, while H shares
surged 3% and closed at HK$18.60. Rumors
that Vanke leaked information about Ever-
grandeâĂŹs share purchase before official an-
nouncement attracted the attention of China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
which issued a statement for Vanke to pro-
vide an explanation; however, Vanke denied
the allegations. In 2015, Evergrande Group’s
total sales reached 201.34 billion, making it
China’s second largest developer by sales.
Evergrande group cited strong results as a
reason for the share purchase. After a whole
year of the hostile takeover, a consortium of
companies were still willing to join the bat-
tle for control. As more developers increased
their participation, China stocks rose in the
month of August in other sectors such as coal.
Within a week, Evergrande Group increased
its stake to 6.82% at a cost of 14.57 billion
yuan, overtaking An Bang and becoming the
third largest shareholder. Evergrande Group
announced that its share purchase in Vanke
was made out of its cash reserves despite
bearing a 600% debt level that could have
negative impact on VankeâĂŹs ratings. On
August 24, S&P revised VankeâĂŹs outlook
from stable to negative though prevailing
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credit rating remained unchanged. Moody
followed suit and slashed Vanke to negative
due to uncertainty in management and tight-
ened credit conditions.
During the first week of November, Ever-
grande Group increased in Vanke stake to
8.3%. On November 11, CSRC suspended
Evergrande Group’s trading accounts due to
âĂĲabnormal trading behaviorâĂİ, a ten-
dency to snap up publicly traded stocks of
other companies on secondary market. Fur-
themore, Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued
a warning to Evergrande Group to stop us-
ing its insurance unit as a slush for trading
assets. China Insurance Regulation Com-
mission ("CIRC") followed by expressing its
unsupportive stance to Evergrande Life In-
surance and further summoned it to refrain
from the abnormal behavior. In a filing to
Hong Kong Stock Exchange on November
18, Vanke reported that Evergrande had ac-
quired 1.04 billion A shares, boosting their
stake to 9.452% at a total cost of 22.26 bil-
lion yuan. On the same day, Vanke shares
hit a record high of 28.9 yuan per piece.
New World Development, a Hong Kong
based developer was also secretly snapping
VankeâĂŹs A shares on the open market and
their position remained unknown. The feud
got intense, billions of yuan kept pouring
and the lack of transparency exacerbated the
battle. The regulations require that when a
company holds 5% interest in another entity,
it may request a seat on the board of direc-
tors.
4.2 How Baoneng financed the
acquisition
After purchasing about 25.4% of Vanke
at an estimated cost of 43 billion yuan, Bao-
neng was by far Vanke’s largest shareholder.
However, Wang Shi was determined to fight
for his company. On July 17, Vanke asked
CSRC to investigate Baoneng on allegations
of misconduct. Baoneng, through its sub-
sidiary Jushenghua, had set up nine Asset
Management Plans ("AMP") (see Figure 3),
a type of shadow banking arrangement used
to finance stock purchases and takeovers. JP
Morgan & Chase estimated that 26 billion
of the 43 billion yuan was lend by six banks
through AMP, and that AMP funds in China
had already reached 32 trillion yuan. The
banks listed by Vanke to have participated
in setting up the AMPs included Ping An
Bank, Guangfa Bank, China Construction
Bank and China Mingsheng Bank. In ad-
dition to that, Vanke stated that Baoneng
did not qualify to be registered as a share-
holder because they violated regulations. The
courage by Wang Shi to continue battling the
takeover sent the price falling and between
July 4th and July 19th, Vanke shares had
collapsed by 30%, threatening margin calls
and more chaos as banks began to seek an
exit out of the funding arrangements. Bao-
neng was at the verge of a forced liquidation.
In response to the investigation, Shenzhen
Stock Exchange found that Vanke and its
shareholder Jushenghua had violated disclo-
sure regulation, and further issued a letter
requesting the companies to comply. The
CSRC summoned directors of both compa-
nies to meet with the regulatory body and
discuss the matter. The commission ex-
pressed that Vanke and Jushenghua had dis-
regarded the stability of capital markets, sus-
tainable development of the firm and interest
of small shareholders.
The growing trend that conglomerates were
using their insurance arms as vehicles of fi-
nancing takeovers and acquisitions prompted
China Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CIRC) to issue a stern warning against the
behavior. A collaborated effort by CSRC,
CIRC and China Banking Regulatory Com-
mission ("CBRC") to investigate VankeâĂŹs
takeover battle found no irregularities in Bao-
nengâĂŹs fundraising mechanism. The inves-
tigation gave birth to more regulations which
tightened corporate fundraising. On July 27,
a new regulation was passed which stipu-
lated that shareowners who own at least 5%
of a listed firm could not use money netted
through the issuance of Wealth Management
Products ("WMPs"), AMPs or capital raised
from third party fundraising platforms to buy
additional shares in the company.
5 A closer look at major
players
The Vanke takeover battle did not only
test the equity markets in China, but also re-
vealed the extent to which government inter-
feres in corporate takeovers. Companies that
are well connected to powerful officials often
rely on government support when market dy-
namics are deemed disruptive. On one hand,
before he founded Vanke, Wang Shi was once
a railway official married to the daughter
of the then deputy Communist Party boss
of Guangdong province, Wang Ning. When
Wang Shi resigned from the position of gen-
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eral manager in 1999, he appointed Yu Liang
who left a major state owned enterprise to
be his successor. During the takeover battle,
Vanke had the backing of An Bang Insurance
Group, which was the third largest share-
holder of Vanke before Evergrande joined the
tussle. The founder of An Bang, Wu Xiao-
hui is married to the granddaughter of Deng
Xiaoping âĂŞ the communist leader cred-
ited with pioneering ChinaâĂŹs opening up
policy in 1978. It can be argued that the
success of major companies depends on the
relationship that exist between the founders
and officials in positions of power.
On the other hand, Baoneng Group was set
up by two brothers, Yao Zhenhua an el-
der brother of Yao Jianhui, who both con-
trol Foresea Life and Jushenghua. Baoneng
Group, established in 1992 first traded as a
retailing business but further developed into
a massive conglomerate through acquisitions
and it now owns over 40 shopping malls.
Its core businesses include real estate devel-
opment, modern logistic industry, cultural
tourism and financial industry. China Re-
sources, a multi-business holding state-owned
enterprise established in Hong Kong in 1938
as Liow & Company but later renamed China
Resources Company in 1948. The company
was the largest shareholder of Vanke for the
past 15 years before the takeover battle with
14.89% stake. As the battle continued, a
non-executive director of Vanke openly crit-
icized China Resources for lending cash to
Baoneng to finance its acquisition in Vanke.
Baoneng was reported to have pledged 2.02
billion shares in Jushenghua to a division of
China Resources in July 2015. In response,
China Resources stated that the share pledge
was to offset an outstanding payment from
Baoneng on a previous real estate project
that was jointly developed by Baoneng and
its subsidy, China Resources Land in 2015.
Whether China Resources and Baoneng were
acting in concert from the first day of the
tussle remains unknown to the public.
6 A Comparison with
other takeovers
In China, previous acquisitions have not
been as confrontational as the VankeâĂŹs
case. Given that the financial markets in
China are only 30 years old, the business en-
vironment does not support much activism
that can lead to hostile takeover as com-
pared to mature markets. Most corporate
takeovers in China are settled peacefully
through negotiations with the help of local
and provincial authorities in order to min-
imize costs and losses and ensure stability
of the markets. Further transformation in
ChinaâĂŹs financial markets is likely to see
increased activism and corporate takeovers.
In fact, Vanke was not the only company to
undergo corporate takeover in 2015. Tian-
rui International Holding Co. Ltd increased
its stake in the major cement maker China
Shanshui Cement Group Ltd to 28% in the
open market without declaring this to its tar-
get. The tussle went on for several months
after which China Shanshui defaulted and
Tianrui International successfully removed
China ShanshuiâĂŹs management board. In
2004, JapanâĂŹs Sumitomo Mitsui Financial
Group failed to acquire UFJ Holdings when
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group crashed the
takeover efforts. However, outside China,
Chinese firms have become popular for huge
acquisitions and investments in real estate,
football clubs and high tech firms. In U.S
equity markets, corporate takeovers began
as early as 1893 characterized by horizontal
mergers where firms in manufacturing and
mining were combining to eliminate compe-
tition. Early examples of U.S acquisitions
include Standard Oil Company of New Jer-
sey founded in 1870, which made a series
of acquisitions and finally became known as
the New Jersey Holding Company; followed
by United States Steel Corporation in 1901.
Another great wave of hostile mergers in U.S
happened after the dotcom boom in early
1990s and they were characterized by Lever-
aged Buy-outs.
7 Farewell to Arms
After fighting relentlessly for a year and a
half, Wang Shi managed to bring back Shen-
zhen Metro, the same company whose 60
billion yuan deal was blocked by China Re-
sources Company in a vote in June 2016. On
13 January 2017, Shenzhen Metro announced
that it would buy the entire 15.3% stake of
VankeâĂŹs second largest shareholder, China
Resources for 37.17 billion yuan, thus, an
average of 22 yuan per share. Part of the
agreement also meant that Shenzhen Metro
would take over the three board seats in
Vanke, which were previously held by China
Resources. Apart from that, in June 2017,
Shenzhen Metro announced plans for a major
acquisition of Vanke, which led to the suspen-
sion of Vanke shares for a week from June 7
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to 11. The restructuring plan saw Shen-
zhen Metro acquiring 1.55 billion A-shares
at a cost of 18.80 yuan per share (a total
of 29.2 billion yuan) from EvergandeâĂŹs
subsidiary Hengda Real Estate Group that
controlled 14.07% of Vanke. The restructur-
ing made Shenzhen Metro the largest share-
holder of Vanke garnering 29.37% control in
total.This deal marked the end of the hostile
takeover for Vanke. On June 21, 2017, Wang
Shi announced his resignation as Chairman
of Vanke. The companyâĂŹs president Yu
Liang took over as the Chairman of the real
estate conglomerate. On the same day, Shen-
zhen Metro, VankeâĂŹs largest shareholder
proposed nominees for board of directors of
whom three were original Vanke directors.
Shenzhen Metro did not nominate any di-
rectors from second or third largest share-
holders. An investigation by CIRC revealed
that Yao Zhenhua, Chairman of Baoneng had
used funds from his insurance company to un-
dertake a hostile takeover. On January 27,
Yao Zhenhua was stripped off his leadership
position in Foresea Life Insurance and effec-
tively barred from the insurance industry for
a period of 10 years. CIRC also banned Ever-
grande Life, the insurance arm of Evergrande
Group, from investing in stocks.
On June 30, the new board was sworn in,
headed by Yu Liang as the new chairman of
the board. Although Baoneng Group did
not show up at the swearing in meeting,
Vanke announced that Baoneng Group had
expressed support for the new board. The
new board agreed that, Vanke, in partner-
ship with Shenzhen Metro would continue
to focus on providing integrated urban ser-
vices, expanding realty business partnership
to property management. The board also
put up a plan to build 32 lines in total in the
next 10 to 15 years as Shenzhen Metro and
Vanke continue their expansion into second
and third tier cities.
8 Conclusion
The hostile takeover became a yardstick
for development in ChinaâĂŹs financial mar-
kets. In the context of China, the markets
are young but with improved regulation and
transformation, other foreign firms will be-
come prevalent players in the market. To a
greater extent, hostile takeovers in China are
generally not welcome. Vanke became an ex-
ceptional case as one of the testing ground
for hostile takeovers on Chinese soil. The
takeover attracted major players in the finan-
cial markets including banks, hedge funds,
public and private companies. It is interest-
ing to note while the government had to leave
the battle to market participants, it also had
a duty to guarantee a level playing field for
all players. Whether the government carried
out its responsibility without bias is subject
to debate, given that VankeâĂŹs âĂŸwhite
nightâĂŹ was a state-owned conglomerate.
The Vanke takeover battle could mark the
genesis of more hostile takeovers in China; a
phenomenon that United States has experi-
enced since 1890s.
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